Israel’s attack on Iran, as argued by Tel Aviv, was aimed at preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Regardless of whether this assertion holds true, a critical question arises from this situation: does Iran’s current lack of nuclear weapons pose an existential danger to the regime’s continued existence?
During its strikes, Israel specifically targeted Iran’s nuclear sites and reportedly killed key scientists and top military brass.
Additionally—just hours prior to Israel’s attack—the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had determined that Iran was not adhering to its nonproliferation commitments.
In the view of experts, one of Iran’s options in the wake of the strikes could be to continue developing nuclear weapons, which Israel perceives as an “existential threat.” Kenneth Pollack, Vice-President for policy at the Middle East Institute in Washington, stated, “For many Iranian leaders, an Iran without a nuclear weapon (or the potential to have one) is an existential threat to the survival of the regime itself.” Kenneth Pollack’s analysis reflected that “Israel has opened a Pandora’s box: the worst Iranian response might also be the most likely, a decision to withdraw from its arms control commitments and build nuclear weapons in earnest.”
Moreover, a recent IAEA report found that Iran enriched uranium up to 60%, which is considered a short technical step away from weapons-grade levels (often defined by the IAEA as 90% uranium). The agency reported that it couldn’t verify the country’s total uranium supply since 2021 but estimates it to be around 9,247 kg as of May 17, 2025. The amount of uranium enriched to 60% was 408.6 kg, the report continued. According to an article in The Washington Post, Iran possesses enough fissile material that—if further enriched—would be sufficient for several nuclear weapons. “Iran now has a supply of highly enriched uranium that could be converted into weapons-grade fuel for at least three bombs in a time frame ranging from a few days to a few weeks,” the article stated.
The latest Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on Iran’s Nuclear Weapon Production indicates that numerous IAEA reports claim Iran has been producing batches of enriched uranium containing up to 2% U-235, up to 5% U-235, up to 20% U-235, and up to 60% U-235, respectively. It is pertinent to mention here that the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA) mandates restrictions on Iran’s declared enrichment capacity and requires that Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile must not exceed 300 kilograms of UF6 containing 3.67% U-235 “or the equivalent in other chemical forms.”
The aforementioned JCPOA restrictions were designed to constrain Iran’s nuclear program such that Tehran, utilizing its declared enrichment facilities, would have required a minimum of one year to produce enough weapons-grade Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) for one nuclear weapon for at least 10 years. The agreement does not explicitly mandate such a timeline. However, six years after the Trump administration’s controversial decision to withdraw from the pact, these restraints have progressively diminished, leaving Iran closer to nuclear weapons capability than at any other point in the country’s history.
In March 2023, Mark Milley—US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—testified that Iran would need “several months to produce an actual nuclear weapon.” The question that now arises is what effect Israel’s attack will have on Iran’s trajectory toward producing nuclear warheads? This might indeed be a billion-dollar question for many today.
